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Is Social Categorization Spatially
Organized in a “Mental Line”?
Empirical Evidences for Spatial Bias
in Intergroup Differentiation
Fabio Presaghi* and Marika Rullo†
Dipartimento di Psicologia dei Processi di Sviluppo e Socializzazione, Sapienza Università di Roma, Rome, Italy
Social categorization is the differentiation between the self and others and between
one’s own group and other groups and it is such a natural and spontaneous process that
often we are not aware of it. The way in which the brain organizes social categorization
remains an unresolved issue. We present three experiments investigating the hypothesis
that social categories are mentally ordered from left to right on an ingroup–outgroup
continuum when membership is salient. To substantiate our hypothesis, we consider
empirical evidence from two areas of psychology: research on differences in processing
of ingroups and outgroups and research on the effects of spatial biases on processing of
quantitative information (e.g., time; numbers) which appears to be arranged from left to
right on a small–large continuum, an effect known as the spatial-numerical association of
response codes (SNARC). In Experiments 1 and 2 we tested the hypothesis that when
membership of a social category is activated, people implicitly locate ingroup categories
to the left of a mental line whereas outgroup categories are located on the far right of
the same mental line. This spatial organization persists even when stimuli are presented
on one of the two sides of the screen and their (explicit) position is spatially incompatible
with the implicit mental spatial organization of social categories (Experiment 3). Overall
the results indicate that ingroups and outgroups are processed differently. The results are
discussed with respect to social categorization theory, spatial agency bias, i.e., the effect
observed in Western cultures whereby the agent of an action is mentally represented on
the left and the recipient on the right, and the SNARC effect.
Keywords: social categorization, spatial biases, spatial agency bias, SNARC effect, ingroup–outgroup
“Us and Them and after all we’re only ordinary men. . .”
Pink Floyd, “Us and Them” lyrics (1973)
INTRODUCTION
Social categorization involves the classification of oneself and others, often unconsciously or
without intention, as members of social groups on the basis of shared attributes such as ethnicity,
physical features, or even psychological traits (Stangor et al., 1992; Kunda and Spencer, 2003;
Abrams, 2012). Self Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987, 1994) posits that people
categorize themselves by exaggerating or emphasizing the perceived similarity amongst members
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of their group (reduction of differences) and, correspondingly, by
emphasizing the differences between their group and members
of the outgroup (meta-contrast principle, Turner et al., 1987;
Oakes et al., 1999). Hence when an “ordinary man” become “us,”
the intergroup differentiation prompts a contrast with “them.”
People’s tendency to synchronize with their social environment
on the base of salient social cues has important consequences for
their working self-concept (Kawakami et al., 2012). Social identity
theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) postulates that when people
identify with a social group or when group membership is salient,
they no longer perceive themselves as just ‘ordinary people’
but as interchangeable members of that group (Turner et al.,
1987, 1994; Hogg and Tindale, 2008). Hence when categorized
as a group member, people are generally motivated to strive to
maintain a positive ingroup identity and to perceive their own
group as morally superior to other groups (Tajfel and Turner,
1979; Oakes and Turner, 1980; Ellemers et al., 2008) or having
more positive attributes and better social status (Sachdev and
Bourhis, 1987, 1991; Spears and Manstead, 1989; Jost and Banaji,
1994). Furthermore, both SCT and SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1979;
Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987) suggest that the simple act
of categorizing people as ingroup or outgroup is sufficient to
generate ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Doise and
Sinclair, 1973; Brewer, 1979, 1999; Turner et al., 1979).
Cognitive Processes Underlying the
Representation of Self in Social Groups
Although there has been extensive research into how social
categorization and social identification lead to ingroup favoritism
at the expense of outgroups (Rubin and Hewstone, 1998;
Hewstone et al., 2002), less is known about the cognitive
processes underlying the representations of social groups. Is
social categorization so pervasive that the processes follow a
specific cognitive organization?
Some studies assessing reaction times (RTs) in an ingroup–
outgroup categorization task (RT interference in self-description
task, Aron et al., 1991; Smith et al., 1999) have found that not
only do people perceive ingroup members as less ‘distant’ than
outgroup members (Brewer, 1991; Smith et al., 1999), but the self
is the “habitual reference point” for comparisons and similarity
judgments (Srull and Gaelick, 1983; Smith et al., 1999, p. 874).
Some authors have also investigated how social categorization
alters estimates of physical distance (Xiao and Van Bavel, 2012)
and have shown that people tend to overestimate the distance
between a domestic (ingroup) and a foreign (outgroup) location
shown on a map, relative to the distance between two domestic
locations or two foreign locations (Burris and Branscombe,
2005). Schubert and Otten (2002) suggested that the degree of
overlap between self and ingroup or outgroup can be represented
by the metaphorical mapping of the self to the group onto the
spatial dimension:
We enter or leave a group; we distance ourselves from a group
or are in the inner circle. Finally, we can be simply in a group,
which then becomes an ingroup: The interrelation constructs
(Higgins and Chaires, 1980, p. 353) in and out denoting ingroup
and outgroup are spatial metaphors.
So it seems reasonable to conclude that ingroups and
outgroups are processed differently and that the self functions as
an exemplary member of the ingroup in this process. Does this
mean that when distinguishing between ingroup and outgroup
by reference to oneself as an ingroup member we represent social
categories in spatial terms?
Spatial Biases and Their Relationship to
Social Categories
The concept of spatial organization of social constructs is not
new; examples include embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999;
Richardson et al., 2003; Smith, 2005) and spatial agency bias
(SAB; Chatterjee, 2002; Maass et al., 2009). In particular, SAB
is the notion that cultures with a left-to-right (LR) script are
characterized by an LR scanning habit and by a standard ordering
of subject (agent) and object in building (active) phrases. Both
factors contribute to culture-specific spatial biases; for example,
the perception that time flows LR (Gevers et al., 2004) or mental
representation of numbers with smaller numbers on the left
(Dehaene et al., 1993), but they also favor the representation of
the actions related to intergroup situations in a way that reflects
the default ordering of subject and object in a phrase, such that
more agentic actors are mentally represented on the left and the
less agentic actors on the right (Maass et al., 2014). Moreover,
SAB has also been found to be closely related to stereotypic
expectations: stereotypically more agentic actors tend to be
represented toward the left (Maass et al., 2014). Maass et al. (2014)
argued that these spatial biases often influence communication
between social groups in a subtle way and we believe that another
kind of social bias is involved when social category rather than
agency is salient. In particular, we hypothesized that when social
category becomes salient, the representation of social category is
organized such that the category to which one belongs is located
on the left, near the self.
Hypotheses
One of the most stable and frequently replicated spatial biases
is the spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC)
effect first described by Dehaene et al. (1993) and Wood et al.
(2008). The SNARC effect is that in a parity-judgment RT task,
reactions to large target numbers are faster when the response
is made on the right-hand side than when it is made on the
left-hand side, i.e., large size is associated with right and small
size with left (Dehaene et al., 1993, p. 380). The brain seems
to represent magnitude information spatially, like numbers on
a ruler. On the basis of the results of Dehaene et al. (1993) and
the notion of a metaphorical mental ruler, we believe that the
conceptual distance between ingroup and outgroup may also be
represented spatially, with the self located at the origin, on the
left, with the ingroup nearby, and also on the left. We therefore
argue that social categories may be spatially organized along a
‘social mental ruler’ representing the distance from the ingroup
(on the left) to the outgroup (to the right). In particular, we
hypothesized that when group membership is salient, people will
consider ingroup as nearer to the self than outgroup. In line
with this, we predicted that people when responding with the left
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hand (the hand nearer to the mental representation of self, i.e.,
the reference point), people would respond faster to an ingroup
symbol than to an outgroup symbol and vice versa.
Before describing the three experiments carried out for this
study, we offer a final comment on the distinction between
the spatial organization of social categories (SOSC) and SAB.
The SOSC, since it involves asymmetries in the LR mental
representation of the social category presented on the center of
the screen, predicts that left-hand responses should be faster to
ingroup stimuli than to outgroup stimuli. Thus SOSC implies a
mental map. The SAB predicts that responses to ingroup (more
agentic) stimuli will be faster when they are presented on the left
than when they are presented on the right (Maass and Russo,
2003, p. 299). In other words, SAB is based on explicit (physical)
mapping of (agentic) stimuli. SOSC is also more general than
SAB, as it is not limited to agentic aspects of social categories and
should extend to all salient social categories. In addition SOSC
is independent from the language schema (sequence of subject-
object in active phrasing) and may be driven by simple images
linked to the ingroup–outgroup categorization.
We tested our prediction that social categories are spatially
organized in three experiments based on a left–right RT task.
In Study 1 participants were assigned to teams on the basis of
their favorite color and then asked to categorize faces according
to whether they belonged to the same color team (ingroup) or
the other team, using their hand and working as fast as possible.
In Study 2 we attempted to replicate and generalize the findings
of Study 1 using a different social category (nationality). Finally,
in Study 3, we investigated the effects of conflict between the
implicit spatial organization of social categories and their explicit
positioning in physical space.
STUDY 11
Materials and Methods
Participants
We calculated the required sample size as 18, based on the
fact that the experimental design involved two repeated factors
(response key: left vs. right and membership: ingroup vs.
outgroup), the assumption (based on the results of Dehaene et al.,
1993) that the interaction effect we hoped to observe would be
modest (η2p = 0.10, f = 0.33), a critical α of 0.05, a power
(1-β) of 0.90, an assumed average correlation of 0.5 between
the repeated measures and homogeneity of variances (ε = 1).
A more pessimistic assumption about effect size (η2p = 0.05,
f = 0.23) suggested a required sample size of 35 participants.
A moderate violation of the assumption of homogeneity of
variances (ε = 0.7) and a very pessimistic assumption about
effect size (η2p = 0.05, f = 0.23) would require a sample of
36 participants. We therefore recruited a sample of 45 English-
speaking students (F = 16, M = 29, M age 23.53 years,
SD = 3.38) via Prolific. All participants were right-handed and
naive to the purpose of the experiment. Only mean correct
1Data of the three experiments are available at the following web address:
https://osf.io/w3udk/
response times were analyzed, so all participants with more
than 15% incorrect responses were excluded from the analysis.
Furthermore, all RTs lower than 250 ms and greater than
1000 ms (6.6% of all trials) were excluded from the analysis.
Thus the final sample comprised 40 students (women: n= 13, M
age = 23.23 years, SD = 3.17; men: n = 27, M age = 23.63 years,
SD = 3.41). This study was carried out in accordance with
the recommendations of Ethical Committee for Psychological
Research at the University of Sapienza and all participants
provided written, informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the
Ethical Committee for Psychological Research at the University
of Sapienza.
Procedure and Materials
The whole procedure was carried out online. Participants
were given detailed instructions about how to perform the
experimental task. It was stressed that to perform well they would
need to be in a quiet room with no distractions and should
use computer with a QWERTY keyboard. This last requirement
was necessary because the task required participants to use both
hands to categorize social stimuli: the left-hand to press the ‘A’
key and the right-hand to press the ‘L’ key. Participants were
told that their task was to categorize faces into two types -
members of their own team and members of the other teams -as
fast as possible. Group identity was induced in accordance with
the minimal group paradigm (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969; Tajfel
et al., 1971). Thus before the categorization task participants were
assigned to a color team on the basis of their color preference
(they were asked to choose between five different colors: red, blue,
green, orange, and black). At this point color team membership
was made salient by informing participants that “Participants
that also [preferred the same color] showed to be really faster
and more precise in the RT Task than participants assigned to
[the other color] TEAM. Before assigning you to the [preferred]
color-TEAM you have to show that you are also as fast and
precise as members of the [preferred] color-TEAM are. So we
invite you to perform the following RT Task and on the base
of your performance we will decide whether we can make you
part of [preferred] color-TEAM or not.” After they had read this
information participants were temporarily assigned to the team
of their preferred color and another random color was chosen
as the other team. Participants were then instructed to perform
the training RT. At the end of this preliminary task a message
informed them that their performance was in line with that
expected for their preferred color team and they were assigned
to that team.
Next, participants were introduced to the Social
Categorization Task. The stimuli (4.7◦ × 4.7◦) were female
or male faces with the color-TEAM positioned below the
photograph (Figure 1) and were presented one at a time. Each
trial started with the presentation of a blank screen for 1.5 s,
then a fixation cross (0.5◦ × 0.5◦) was presented in the center
of the screen for 300 ms, followed by the target image. After a
response (correct; incorrect) the next trial was presented. Each
photograph was presented twice and the order of presentation
was randomized. Images of six students of the same sex and
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FIGURE 1 | Example of Stimuli (Male, Female with two of the five possible
color TEAM) used in the Social Categorization Task of Study 1 (face stimuli are
taken from MacBrain Stimulus Set, Tottenham et al., 2009).
ethnicity as the participant were assigned to the participant’s
team and images of six other students were assigned to the
other team (Figure 1). Thus a block of trials consisted of 24
trials and the task consisted of two experimental blocks (total
of 48 trials). In one of the two blocks the images were presented
in the center of the screen and participants were instructed
to press the ‘A’ key with their left hand when a member of
their own team appeared and to press the ‘L’ key with their
right-hand when a member of the other team appeared; in the
other block the response mapping was reversed and participants
were asked to press the ‘A’ with the left when a member of
the other color team appeared on the on the screen and to
press the ‘L’ key with the right hand when a member of the
preferred color team was presented. The trials in the block
in which the participant’s team was associated with the left
response key are referred to as ‘corresponding trials’ because we
expected a match between the implicit spatial mapping of social
categories and the response mapping of the task; those in the
other block are referred to as ‘non-corresponding trials’ because
we expected a conflict between the implicit spatial mapping
of social categories and the response mapping of the task. The
order in which the blocks were presented was counterbalanced
across participants. The faces used as stimuli were selected
from the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set2 (Tottenham et al., 2009),
which consists of 646 facial expressions displayed by models
varying with respect to gender and race for use in studies on
emotion recognition. Each model in the Stimulus Set is shown
displaying the following emotional expression: fearful, happy,
sad, angry, surprised, calm, neutral, and disgusted. To control for
potential confounding effects of gender, participants classified
images of people of their own gender. We therefore selected
two sets of stimuli: male and female. Each set consisted of 12
different Caucasian models displaying a neutral expression, 6
were assigned to the ingroup and 6 were assigned the outgroup.
Stimuli were presented using the software package JATOS (Kühn
and Filevich, 2015) and jsPsych libraries developed by de Leeuw
(2015).
2http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm
Measures
Assessment of ingroup favoritism
After being assigned to their preferred color team, participants
were asked to describe how they felt about being part of it by
rating six adjectives (happy; excited; motivated; disappointed;
enthusiastic; full of energy) on a scale ranging from 1 (‘does
not describe me at all’) to 5 (‘describes me completely’). Internal
consistency for the measure was of 0.90 in this study. Participants
also described their feelings about the other team using the same
six items and the same rating scale. Reliability of the measure was
0.92. The minimal group paradigm procedure was successful in
inducing the ingroup favoritism as the difference between ratings
of the teams was statistically significant [t(39) = 4.85, p < 0.01,
Cohen’s d = 0.58] with the preferred color team scoring higher
(M= 3.04, SD= 0.77) than the other team (M= 2.56, SD= 0.87).
Reaction times
Only mean correct RTs between 250 and 1000 ms were
considered. Participants with less than 85% correct responses
were excluded.
Results
Two-way ANOVA with response key (left vs. right) and
membership (preferred color-TEAM = ingroup vs. other-
color TEAM = outgroup) as within-subject factors revealed
a significant interaction effect [F(1,39) = 7.79, p = 0.008,
η2p = 0.167; Figure 2). A simple effects analysis showed that
the difference between ingroup and outgroup was significant
both when we consider the left-hand responses [F(1,39) = 7.11,
p = 0.011, η2p = 0.154] with faster mean RTs when the left-key
response was associated with the ingroup (M = 487, MSE = 16)
than when it was associated with the outgroup (M = 513,
MSE = 18), and when we consider the right-hand responses
[F(1,39) = 4.37, p = 0.043, η2p = 0.101] with faster RTs when
the right key was associated with the outgroup (M = 475,
MSE = 14) than when it was associated with the ingroup
(M = 497, MSE = 17). There was no main effect of response
key [F(1,39) = 3.84, p = 0.057, η2p = 0.090] or membership
[F(1,39) = 0.19, p = 0.667, η2p = 0.005]. When a block sequence
factor (block1 = ingroup-left response key; block2 = outgroup-
left response key vs. block1 = outgroup-left response key;
block2 = ingroup-left response key) was added to the ANOVA,
the interaction between response key and membership remained
significant [F (1,38) = 7.66, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.168], and the
three-way interaction (Response-Key by the Membership by the
Block Sequence) was not significant [F(1,38) = 2.85, p = 0.100,
η2p = 0.070] and no interaction between block sequence and
membership [F(1,38) = 0.13, p = 0.723, η2p = 0.003] or response
key [F(1,38)= 0.90, p= 0.348, η2p= 0.023) was significant. Finally
there was no main effect of block sequence [F(1,38) = 1.02,
p= 0.319, η2p = 0.026].
STUDY 2
In Study 2 our aim was to demonstrate the generalization of the
SOSC effect to a different social group. To do this, we treated
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FIGURE 2 | Study 1: When the ingroup stimuli is presented on the screen,
participants are faster in responding with the left hand with respect to the right
hand. Besides, when the outgroup stimuli are presented, right-hand
responses are faster than the left-hand responses. Error bars indicate
±1 MSE.
nationality as a social category. The stimuli were images of t-shirts
in different colors showing an image of the Italian or French flag
(Figure 3).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Forty-three Italian university students (F = 27; M = 16;
M age= 20.77 years, SD = 0.89) who had not participated
in the previous study were enrolled in this experiment.
All participants were right-handed. Eight participants were
subsequently excluded from analyses because their error rate
was too high (greater than 15%). This study was carried out
in accordance with the recommendations of Ethical Committee
for Psychological Research at the University of Sapienza and all
participants provided written, informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved
by the Ethical Committee for Psychological Research at the
University of Sapienza.
Procedure and Materials
The experimental design was broadly the same as in Study 1,
but the experiment was conducted in a laboratory rather than
online and the stimuli were t-shirts depicting national flags
(Figure 3) instead of faces. In addition participants were asked
to complete a recall task by reporting how important it was for
them to be identified as Italian rather than European, which
was designed to make membership of the target social category
(Italian nationality) salient. After the priming procedure all
participants completed a nine-item social identification scale
designed to measure the relative strength of individual and group
identity (Hogg et al., 1998). Next, participants were introduced
FIGURE 3 | Example of Stimuli (National Flags: France vs. Italy) of the Social
Categorization Task used in Study 2 and 3.
to the social categorization task. Stimulus presentation and data
collection was controlled by an IBM Thinkcentre computer
connected to a 17-inch monitor. Participants’ viewing distance
was approximately 60 cm. Each trial started with a 1.5-s
presentation of a blank screen followed by a 300-ms presentation
of a central fixation cross (0.5◦ × 0.5◦), after which the target
image was presented. The next trial started once a response
had been made. In this study the ingroup stimuli were images
(4.7◦ × 4.7◦, i.e., approximately the same size of stimuli as in
Study 1) of t-shirts of six different colors depicting the Italian flag.
T-shirts in the same six colors but showing the French flag were
used as outgroup stimuli. All stimuli were presented twice per
block, in a randomized sequence, yielding a total of 24 trials (12
ingroup trials; 12 outgroup trials). As in Study 1, the experimental
task comprised two blocks of 24 experimental trials, yielding a
total of 48 trials. In one of the two blocks participants were asked
to press the left response key when the Italian flag appeared and
the right response key when the French flag appeared; in the other
block this association was reversed and participants were asked
to press the left-key when the French flag appears on the screen
and the right-key when the Italian flag appears on the screen. As
in Study 1, the sequence of two blocks was randomized. The two
blocks were preceded by a 12-trial training block (6 ingroup trials;
6 outgroup trials) in which participants were given feedback on
the correctness of their categorization responses. Stimuli were
presented using the software package PsychoPy 1.82.01 (Peirce,
2007, 2009).
Measures
Priming for identification
Participants were asked to recall and describe an especially salient
event or a situation when they had felt proud to be Italian
and then they were asked to describe how they felt by rating
five emotional adjectives (‘happy’; ‘excited’; ‘motivated’; ‘realized’;
‘enthusiastic’) using a scale ranging from 1 (does not describe me
at all) to 5 (describes me completely). The internal consistency
(Cronbach’s alpha) for the priming index was 0.86 and the average
priming score was M = 3.44 (SD= 0.86).
Individual vs. Group Identification (Hogg et al., 1998, p. 1256):
a nine-item scale focusing on the importance for the self of and
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liking for, identification with, and a sense of belonging to a group
(on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 not very much to 9 very much)
was adapted to the present study to measure how much they
identified with their nationality. Internal consistency reliability
index was 0.91 with an average score of M = 6.28 (SD = 1.59)
in the present study.
Reaction times
Mean RTs for correct responses were analyzed. RTs lower than
250 ms or greater than 1000 ms (5.4% of all trials) were excluded
from analysis and data from participants with less than 85%
correct responses were also excluded.
Results
Two-way ANOVA of RTs with membership and response key
as within-subject factors revealed an SOSC effect qualified
by the interaction between response key and membership
[F(1,34) = 13.75, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.288). A simple effects
analysis showed that there was a difference between left-hand RTs
to ingroup and outgroup stimuli (Figure 4) [F(1,34) = 22.08,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.394], with faster RTs to ingroup images
(M = 571, MSE = 18) than to outgroup images (M = 616,
MSE = 21). However, there was no difference between right-
hand RTs to ingroup and outgroup stimuli [F(1,34) = 2.82,
p = 0.102, η2p = 0.077] with faster RTs when outgroup images
are presented (M = 591, MSE = 19) than when ingroup images
are presented (M = 608, MSE = 19). There was a main effect of
membership [F(1,34) = 5.78, p = 0.022, η2p = 0.145], with faster
RTs to ingroup stimuli (M = 590, MSE = 17) than to outgroup
stimuli (M = 603, MSE = 19). Finally, there was no effect of
response key [F(1,34)= 0.45, p= 0.507, η2p = 0.013). As in Study
1 we repeated the analysis including a block sequence factor.
There was no three-way membership by response key by block
sequence interaction [F(1,33)= 1.21, p= 0.280, η2p = 0.035) and
the interaction between membership and response key remained
significant [F (1,33) = 13.59, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.292]. There
was no interaction between block sequence and membership
[F(1,33) = 1.18, p = 0.286, η2p = 0.034) or response key
[F(1,33) = 0.03, p = 0.870, η2p = 0.001]; however, there was
a main effect of block sequence [F(1,33) = 20.82, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.387] such that participants responded more quickly when
the left response key was associated with the outgroup in the first
block (M = 530, MSE= 20) than when it was associated with the
ingroup (M = 659, MSE= 20).
STUDY 3
In Studies 1 and 2 we collected empirical evidence that the SOSC
effect applied to two different social categories. In Study 3 we
used the same stimuli and task format as in Study 2, but we also
manipulated the location of stimulus presentation, i.e., stimuli
were no longer presented in the center of the screen but on
the left or right side of the screen. By varying the position of
stimuli in the visual field, we were able to investigate whether
the implicit LR representation of social categories (respectively
ingroup and outgroup) was modulated by the explicit position of
FIGURE 4 | Study 2: The Spatial Organization of Social Categorization effect
when the social categories are represented by Nationalities (Italy = Ingroup vs.
France = Outgroup). Error bars indicate ±1 MSE.
social categories in physical space (i.e., on the left or right side
of the visual field). In other words, in our first two experiments
we examined whether the implicit mapping activated by the
SOSC effect emerges when social categories are presented in the
center of the screen. This mapping is implicit as it represents
the mental arrangement of social categories along a hypothetical
social continuum with the ingroup on the left and the outgroup
on the right. Because the stimuli were presented in the center of
the screen in the first two experiments, we do not know whether
the SOSC effect can still be observed when this implicit mapping
conflicts with the explicit physical (Left–Right) positioning of the
stimuli. In particular we were interested in comparing conditions
in which the stimulus was displayed on the same side as the
correct response key (compatible response) or on the opposite
side from the correct response key (incompatible response).
These two conditions are illustrated in Figure 5, where the upper
panel shows two pairs of compatible conditions in which ingroup
or outgroup images are presented on the left of the screen and are
associated with the left-hand response (Figure 5, a1 conditions)
or presented on the right of the screen and associated with the
right-hand response (Figure 5, a2 conditions). There are also
two pairs of incompatible conditions: the first involves pairing
an ingroup or outgroup images on the right of the screen with
a left-hand response (Figure 5, b1 conditions) and the second
involves pairing an ingroup or outgroup image on the left of the
screen with the right-hand response (Figure 5, b2 conditions).
If the SOSC effect applies then we would expect left-hand RTs
to left-screen images of the ingroup to be faster than left-hand
RTs to left-screen images of the outgroup and correspondingly
right-hand RTs to right-screen outgroup images to be faster than
right-hand RTs to right-screen ingroup images. It is not clear,
however, what the pattern of responses would be in the two pairs
of incompatible conditions. If the SOSC effect is independent
of the explicit position of stimuli then we would expect that
left-hand responses would be faster to ingroup stimuli than to
outgroup stimuli, regardless of the position of the stimuli on the
screen. In particular we would expect participants to be faster in
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responding with left-hand to ingroup images than to outgroup
images presented on the right of the screen. Correspondingly we
expect participants to be faster also when responding with the
right-hand to outgroup images than to ingroup images presented
on the left side of the screen. On the contrary if the SOSC effect
is dependent on the explicit position of the stimuli then the
association between responding hand and category membership
should not apply in the incompatible conditions.
When it comes to the SNARC effect, Notebaert et al. (2006)
have already investigated whether implicit and explicit spatial
information share the same spatial representation and found
that stimulus location modulated the SNARC effect: a typical
SNARC effect was observed when the implicit spatial mapping
rule was compatible with the explicit spatial information whereas
a reversed SNARC effect was observed when the implicit
spatial mapping rule was incompatible with the explicit spatial
information. According to Notebaert et al. (2006) this result was
due to the fact that both types of spatial information (implicit
and explicit) activate the same spatial representation. A similar
line of reasoning can be applied to our Experiment 3: as already
stated, if an SOSC effect were observed in both compatible and
incompatible conditions (Figure 5) we would conclude that the
implicit representation of SOSC is independent from the explicit
positions of stimuli. On the contrary if an SOSC effect were
observed in the compatible conditions and a reversed SOSC effect
in the incompatible conditions then we would conclude that that
the implicit position of ingroup and outgroup stimuli activated
by the SOSC effect shares the same spatial representation of the
explicit position of the same stimuli.
Manipulating the positions of the stimuli and the responding
hand also raised the possibility that we would observe a Simon
effect (Simon, 1969). The Simon effect occurs when participants
respond faster and more accurately when an irrelevant position
stimulus (for example, left side of the screen) is matched with
the response (for example, left key-press) than when it does
not match with the response key. In our experiment, a Simon
effect would manifest as faster responding when using the hand
on the same side as the stimulus (i.e., responses to left-screen
stimuli would be faster with the left hand than with the right
and vice versa), independently of social category. In this case,
the explicit position of the stimulus activates the nearer hand and
explicit mapping of stimulus-hand takes precedence over implicit
mapping in responding to the stimulus, independently of social
category.
We also believe that interference between implicit and explicit
mapping can be used to disentangle the SOSC effect from the
SAB effect. The SAB effect involve more agentic categories being
represented on the left of a mental continuum and is related to
the structure of active phrases – the subject (the agent) precedes
the object. In other words, the SAB is triggered by the explicit
position of (agentic) stimuli. In our Study 3, the SAB effect should
manifest as faster responding to ingroup stimuli than to outgroup
stimuli when located on the left and should be independent of
the laterality of the response. So if the SAB is active we would
find a significant interaction between the social category and the
side of presentation independently of the responding hand. On
the contrary, the SOSC effect predicts that respondents should be
faster not only when the ingroup category is associated with a left-
hand response but also when the outgroup is associated with the
right-hand response. In other words the SOSC effect depends on
the responding hand, not the stimulus location. Hence, if there
is an SAB effect then we would observe an interaction between
social category and stimulus location.
Study 3 thus allowed us to test not only whether implicit
mapping and explicit mapping share the same spatial
representation but also will allow us to disentangle the SOSC
effect from the SAB effect.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The sample comprised 50 right-handed students (F= 29, M= 21;
M age = 20.62 years, SD = 0.75) who had not taken part in any
of the preceding studies. Four participants were excluded from
the analysis because they responded incorrectly to an entire block
of trials or had too high an error rate (>15%). The final sample
thus comprised 46 participants. This study was carried out in
accordance with the recommendations of the Ethical Committee
for Psychological Research at the University of Sapienza and all
participants provided written, informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved
by the Ethical Committee for Psychological Research at the
University of Sapienza.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were presented with a series of stimuli associated
with the ingroup or outgroup, as in the previous studies, but in
this experiment they were presented to the left or right side of
the screen, rather than in the center. Thus there were now three
experimental factors: social category (ingroup vs. outgroup),
responding hand (left vs. right) and presentation side (left vs.
right). As described above this yielded eight conditions, four
‘compatible’ and four ‘incompatible.’ The compatible conditions
(Figure 5, conditions a1 and a2) are those where the stimulus
is presented on the same side as the correct response. So we
have the images (whether ingroup or outgroup) presented on
the left and the responding hand is left (Figure 5, a1); or images
(whether ingroup or outgroup) presented on the right and the
responding hand is the right (Figure 5, a2). The incompatible
conditions are those conditions where the images (ingroup or
outgroup) are presented on the opposite side to the correct
response (Figure 5, b1: right-side stimulus, left response correct;
b2: left-side stimulus, right response correct).
The experimental task was divided into two blocks of 24 trials
and the stimuli appear to the left or on the right of the central
fixation point. In one of the two blocks (spatially compatible
condition) participants had to press the left response key when
the Italian flag appeared on the screen and the right response
key when the French flag appeared, regardless of the location
of the flag. In the spatially incompatible block this association
was reversed, so that participants had to press the right response
key when the Italian flag was shown and the left response key
when the French flag was shown, regardless of the location in
which the flag appeared. Each stimulus type appeared the same
number of times and each location and the order of locations
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FIGURE 5 | Description of the compatible and non-compatible conditions used in Experiment 3. (A) In compatible condition there is a match between the responding
hand and the position of the social category on the screen. (B) In the non-compatible condition the image is presented on the opposite side of the responding hand.
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was balanced and randomized. Block order was counterbalanced
so half the participants performed the spatially compatible block
first and half performed the spatially incompatible block first.
The experimental blocks were preceded by a training block in
which participants were given feedback about their responses.
The upper and lower RT limits were the same as in Studies 1 and 2
(250 ms; 1000 ms) and RTs fell outside these limits on about 6.5%
of all trials. The procedure and measures were the same as in the
Study 2, but the experimental design included stimulus position
(left; right) as an additional experimental factor. The stimuli were
images of t-shirts showing the French or Italian national flag, as in
Study 2, but were presented to the left or right side of the screen.
Also as in Study 2 the experimental task was preceded by a recall
task designed to make the target social category salient. We used
the same priming procedure as in Study 2.
Results
The full factorial design in experiment 3 is a Social Category
(ingroup vs. outgroup) × Hand (left vs. right) × Compatibility
(compatible vs. non-compatible) factorial design. The three-
way interaction was not significant [F(1,45) = 1.61, p = 0.211,
η2p = 0.034]; other results, i.e., simple effects analysis of the three-
way interaction are discussed in the Supplementary Material.
There was a two-way interaction between social category
(ingroup vs. outgroup) with the responding hand (left-hand
vs. right-hand) [F(1,45) = 20.24, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.308]
confirming the presence of an SOSC effect that was independent
of whether the stimulus appeared on the same side as the correct
response key. In particular (Figure 6) we found that participants’
left-hand responses were faster [F(1,45) = 18.89, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.296] when they were responding to an ingroup stimulus
(M = 613, MSE = 14) than when they were responding to an
outgroup stimulus (M = 646, MSE = 15), whilst the opposite
pattern applied to right-hand responding: participants were faster
[F(1,45) = 11.58, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.205] in responding to
outgroup stimuli (M = 621, MSE = 14) than ingroup stimuli
(M = 649, MSE = 15). There was also an interaction between
responding hand and compatibility [F(1,45) = 4.12, p = 0.048,
η2p = 0.084). A simple effects analysis showed (Figure 7) that
when responding with their left hand, participants were faster
[F(1,45)= 5.25, p= 0.027, η2p = 0.104] in compatible conditions
(M= 621, MSE= 14) than in incompatible conditions (M= 641,
MSE= 15), but when responding with their right hand, RTs were
similar [F(1,45) = 0.21, p = 0.649, η2p = 0.005) in compatible
conditions (M = 635, MSE = 15) and incompatible conditions
(M = 632, MSE = 14). There was no interaction between social
category and compatibility factor [F(1,45) = 0.23, p = 0.632,
η2p = 0.005] and no main effect of social category [F(1,45)= 2.23,
p = 0.142, η2p = 0.047]; responding hand [F(1,45) = 0.39,
p = 0.536, η2p = 0.009]; or compatibility [F(1,45) = 2.49,
p= 0.122, η2p = 0.052].
Our second hypothesis related to whether the SAB effect
was activated in the social category task with variable stimulus
position. Compatibility was irrelevant to this hypothesis so we
ran a three-way ANOVA with social category, responding hand,
and stimulus location to determine whether the SAB effect
FIGURE 6 | Study 3: The interaction between social category (Ingroup vs.
Outgroup) with the responding hand (left-hand vs. right-hand) independently
of whether the side of presentation of stimuli matches the responding hand
(compatible conditions) or not (non-compatible conditions). Error bars indicate
±1 MSE.
FIGURE 7 | Study 3: The interaction between responding hand (left hand vs.
right hand) and the compatibility factor (compatible vs. non-compatible),
independent of whether the social category is ingroup or outgroup. Error bars
indicate ±1 MSE.
emerged. There was no interaction between social category and
stimulus location [F(1,45) = 1.61, p = 0.211, η2p = 0.034)
so we can exclude the possibility of an SAB effect. Also the
Simon effect, i.e., the interaction between responding hand and
stimulus location, was not significant [F(1,45) = 2.49, p = 0.122,
η2p = 0.052]. A more thorough presentation and discussion of
these results may be found in the Supplementary Material.
Discussion
There is already evidence that ingroups and outgroups are
processed differently and that the self represents the “habitual
reference of point” (Srull and Gaelick, 1983, p. 111; Aron et al.,
1991; Smith et al., 1999). Moreover, studies of spatial bias in
various areas of psychology have consistently shown that in
Western cultures people tend to order quantity from left to
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right (smaller quantities are represented on the left; Dehaene
et al., 1993; Gevers et al., 2004). The preference for positioning
the sentence subject to the left (Chatterjee, 2002) has led some
authors to advance the hypothesis that people also tend to
envisage intergroup situations (ingroup/outgroup) following a
LR ordering, an effect also known as spatial agency bias (Maass
and Russo, 2003; Maass et al., 2009). Drawing on these studies
on spatial biases and inspired by the literature on the SNARC
effect (Dehaene et al., 1993), we hypothesized that there is also
a spatial dimension to mental representation of social categories,
with ingroups represented on the left of a social continuum and
outgroups on the right.
Evidence from Studies 1 and 2 led us to conclude that
ingroups and outgroups are processed differently when the group
membership is salient. In particular, the overall pattern of RTs in
both experiments show a spatial effect such that when responding
with the left hand, responses to ingroup stimuli were faster
than responses to outgroup stimuli and vice versa. It should
be noted, however, that whilst responses in Study 1 conformed
exactly to this pattern, this was not the case in Study 2. In
Study 2, left-hand responses were faster to ingroup stimuli than
outgroup stimuli, but right-hand RTs were not affected by social
category. One possible explanation for the difference between
the pattern of responding in Studies 1 and 2 is the difference
in the procedure used to make social category salient. In Study
1 participants were assigned to a team on the basis of their
color preference and then asked to perform an RT task to
prove that they had the requisite characteristics for membership
of that team, whereas in Study 2 participants were asked to
recall a memorable past experience when they had felt to be
proud to be Italian. The first paradigm appears to be more
effective than the second, presumably because it is not based on
personal experiences, which may vary dramatically from person
to person.
Just as Dehaene et al. (1993) interpreted their results in terms
of a spatial bias in representation of quantities (SNARC effect),
we interpreted the differential processing of social categories in
terms of spatial bias. We posit that the social category that is
salient at a specific moment is automatically positioned on the left
of the mental map whilst the other categories are positioned on
the right. The spatial arrangement of social categories is dynamic
rather than fixed and determined on the basis of salience as
we can see when we compare the results of Studies 1 and 2.
Different paradigms were used to activate group membership:
in Study 1 we used the classical minimal group procedure to
induce intergroup differences on the basis of color preference,
whereas in Study 2 we used rehearsal of personal experience to
activate nationality as a social category. Our results are consistent
with Schubert and Otten’s (2002) suggestion that when a social
category becomes salient this alters the ratio between intragroup
differences and intergroup differences and consequently ingroups
and outgroups are processed differently. Intragroup difference is
the degree of difference between self-identity and group identity,
whereas intergroup difference is the degree of difference between
ingroup and outgroup at the superordinate level (Schubert and
Otten, 2002). When the membership of a particular social
category becomes salient, people tend to associate themselves
more strongly with that social category (i.e., intragroup difference
decreases) and to differentiate the relevant ingroup more strongly
from outgroups (i.e., intergroup differences decrease with respect
to the salient category). Our results show that this social bias is
reflected in the implicit spatial representation of categories: the
ingroup (and hence the self) is represented on the left and the
outgroup on the far right. The SOSC thus seems to be consistent
with the main predictions of meta-contrast principle (Turner
et al., 1987; Oakes et al., 1999).
The results relating to spatial ordering of social categories
cannot be explained in terms of familiarity with the stimuli.
Participants did not know any of the people whose faces were
used as ingroup and outgroup stimuli, so the spatial difference
in RTs to ingroup faces cannot be explained in terms of
familiarity with those faces. This strengthens our speculation that
participants processed ingroup and outgroup faces differently.
Handedness can also be excluded as a possible explanation
of the LR asymmetry we found, as in the case of SNARC. All
participants were right-handed and if a handedness bias had
been present we would have expected to observe a main effect
of the responding hand, with faster RTs when using the right
hand, independently of the social category of the stimulus. No
such main effect was observed in any of the experiments, and so
we conclude that the SOSC effect we observed was not due to
handedness.
Study 3 demonstrated that the SOSC effect was independent
of the physical position of the social category stimuli. Thus, in
contrast to the findings of Notebaert et al. (2006) in relation to
the SNARC effect, the results of Study 3 imply that simple social
categorization automatically prompts a representation of stimuli
that it is spatially ordered and that is not affected by the position
of stimuli in physical space. So if only one implicit mapping is
allowed, one would predict that the SOSC effect would disappear
when two alternative ingroup categories are both salient and
competing for the same representational mapping. In this case,
participants would have to deal with two conflicting implicit
mappings where two possible ingroups compete for being located
on the left. Furthermore, the results of all three experiments
also help to differentiate SOSC from SAB in different ways. In
Study 1 we used faces and team colors as stimuli and although we
matched the gender of participants and stimulus faces in order
to control for stereotypical effect often found in SAB studies
(Maass et al., 2009), we cannot exclude the possibility that the
SAB effect was automatically activated because ingroup faces
were considered more agentic than outgroup faces. Moreover,
in Study 2, which used different stimuli and different social
categories, we did not find a main effect of social category or
response key, which implies that any SAB effect plays only a
marginal role in the SOSC effect. Finally in Study 3 we used
national flags as stimuli in an experiment in which the implicit
spatial coding of social category conflicted with the physical
position of the stimuli in some trials and also failed to observe
an SAB effect, confirming that ingroup national flags are not
perceived as more agentic than outgroup national flags. Taken
together the results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that the SOSC
effect is a social spatial bias with a different basis from the SAB
effect.
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Future research should be aimed at exploring which factors
affect the spatial ordering of social categories. A first possibility
is that some social groups (e.g., family, close friends) may be
more easily associated with the self than with others (based
on, for e.g., nationality, attendance at the same university).
Do these social groups (e.g., family) automatically prompt
spatial ordering or is salience still critical? Group size may
affect the SOSC effect; it is one of the components of the
‘entitativity’ construct (Sherman et al., 1999; Lickel et al.,
2000; Castano et al., 2003) which, along with others (for a
review see Lickel et al., 2000) represents the degree to which
social groups are perceived as real units (Castano et al., 2003)
and as structured and important groups (Sherman et al.,
1999). Even if evidences supporting the relationship between
the dimension of group and entitativity are not conclusive
(Lickel et al., 2000), most social psychologists agree that the
larger a group, the less it will be perceived as entitative (see
also Lickel et al., 2001). Given that people tend to identify
more strongly with small groups and highly entitative groups
(Castano et al., 2002, 2003; Johnson et al., 2006; Crawford
and Salaman, 2012), such as family or very close friends, we
suggest that the size of groups may also potentially affect
the spatial organization of social groups. We also speculate
that, as with quantity, small and highly entitative groups
tend to be positioned to the left of larger, less entitative
groups.
Although further replications and evidence of generalization
to other social categories are needed, these findings have
important practical implications. In particular, the social
categorization task may be useful as a method of determining
which social categorization takes precedence and may have a role
to play in the measurement of ingroup bias. A more interesting
application is that the SOSC effect introduces the possibility
of reducing the negative effect of intergroup differentiation
through (spatial association) training on counter-categorization
as showed in a recent work by Hu et al. (2015) that proved
effective for the memory consolidation of training effects (Buzsák,
1998; Stickgold, 2005; Backhaus et al., 2008).
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